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Property  tax  systems  have  undergone  rapid  property  taxes.  For  static  equilibrium  to  exist  in change  in almost  every  state  during  the  past  few  the land  market,  both  renter  and  owner  must  be years.  Consequently,  their  distributional  impact  in  equilibrium.  That  is,  rent  paid  by  the  renter merits  investigation.  The  incidence  of  the  prop-  must  be  equal  to  the  value  of  the marginal  pro- erty tax is  at the  heart  of  the distributional  ques-  duct of land,  and  the owner  must receive  a  return
tion.  It  is  generally  felt  that  land  owners  bear  net of taxes on the land's value that is equal to the the full burden of property  taxes and  that changes  opportunity  cost  of  his  available  capital.2 Thus in it are  capitalized  into property  values.  Usually  there  are two profit  maximizing conditions:
it  is  assumed  that  property  taxes  are  not  shifted  Renters:  M  = R  (1) forward  to the consumer,  but there  has  been little  Owners:  V(i) = R -T  (2)
empirical  verification  of  this  notion.  This  paper  where:
will  develop  a  simple  niodel  of  the  land  market  M  = the value of the marginal product of to  test  several  alternative  hypotheses  concerning  land,
the  incidence  of  property  taxes  on  agricultural  R = the rent paid by the renter, la  d- in  the  rentpaid bytherenter, land  in  the  United  States.  T = the value of property taxes paid by
A  SIMPLE  MODEL  OF  THE  the owner,
LAND  MARKET  i = the  opportunity cost of the owner's
capital, and The micro-economics  of property tax is usually  capital,  and V  - the market  value of the land. neglected  in  introductory  agricultural  economics  and
courses,  even though  American  farmers  paid  ap-  Combining (1) and  (2) gives:
proximately  25  percent  .more for  property  taxes  M  V(i)+  T  (3)
than  for  fertilizers  and  lime  in  1972  [2].  While  In other  words, the  value of the  marginal  product
an  individual  firm  manager  has  no  control  over  of land  must be sufficient  to pay  an adequate re-
property  tax,  it  is  important  that  he  be  able  to  turn  to  the  owner  plus  property  taxes.  In  a per-
anticipate  the  economic consequences  of a  change  fectly  competitive,  static  equilibrium,  renters  and
in  property  taxes  on  the  behavior  of  the  neo-  owners  will adjust the intensity of use  of land and
classical  firm.  The  following  model  has  proved  ther factors  such that  (3)  is  satisfied.
to be a useful  conceptual  device.  It will serve  as  a  Let:  M  = Mp(P)  (4)
point  of departure  for the present paper.  and  T = Vt  (5)
Assume  a  perfectly  competitive  market  in  where:
which  all agricultural  land is rented  out  (realizing  Mp = the marginal physical product of land,
that much of the  land  is rented to the  owner him-  P = the price  of the aggregate product,  and
self).  Further  assume  that  the  supply  of  land  is  t = the effective tax rate on agricultural
highly  inelastic.l  The  owner  of  the land  pays  all  land.
Assistant  Professor,  Oklahoma  State  University.  Journal  Article  J-3002  of  the  Oklahoma  Agricultural  Experiment  Station. Throughout  this paper  "land"  and  "property"  are  used  synonymously  to  refer  to  non-reproducible  capital.  The  incidence  of property  taxes  on  that  portion  of  farm  property  that  is  reproducible  is  not treated  in this paper. 2 Income  taxes that  might be  paid on  the net  rental  income  of owners  could  easily  be  included  in  the  model,  but  for  purposes of  simplicity  these  are ignored.
131Then  (3)  may be restated  in  a more  useful form:  States  had  identical  property  tax  rates.  In  this
V(i +  t) = Mp(P)  (6)  case,  property  taxes  would  be  included  in  the
Equation (6) emphasizes  that a change in property  rent charged by owners and would be passed on as
tax rates  may  affect the  land market  in a  variety  a portion  of the fixed costs  of the firm.  In equili-
of  manners.  It  is  generally  accepted  that  as  t  brium, these fixed costs would be passed on to the
changes,  modified  property  taxes  are  capitalized  consumer.  The  property  owner  would  receive  a
into  property  values  causing  V to  vary  inversely  rental  payment  sufficient  to  provide  a return  on
with t. Studies  of land values indicating that cross-  land equal  to that  of other capital,  and to pay the
sectional  differences  in  property  tax  rates  are  property tax. The distributional effect  of full shift-
associated  with  land  value  differences  are  often  ing of  property  taxes  versus no  shifting  (capitali-
cited  in support  of  the notion  that property  taxes  zation  in  land values)  is  to favor  land  owners  at
are  capitalized  into  property values  [1,  9].  the expense of consumers.
Now  assume that one county imposes an addi-
THE  HYPOTHESIS  tional  tax  over  and  above  the  uniform  property
tax.  Local owners  would  find that product prices
The  central  hypothesis  of  this  paper  is  that  and rents  were  both  determined  by conditions  in
property taxes are not necessarily  fully capitalized  the  aggregate  market.  Consequently,  the  renter
into property  values,  but  instead  may be  shifted  would be  unaffected,  but net  return  to the  owner
either forward  or  backward.  While  capitalization  would  fall.  Hence,  a differential  local  tax  above
is  certainly  possible,  equation  (6)  suggests  that  the  global  tax  rate  would  be  capitalized  into  V,
other  adjustments  in  the  land  market  are  also  while  the  global portion  of the tax  is  shifted  for-
possible in reaction to a change in property  taxes.  ward  to  the  consumer.5 If  such  is  the  case,  then
Three  other  variables  (i,  Mp  and  P)  may  also  th  incidence  is  shared  between  consumers  (who
adjust in response to a modified tax rate. A change  bear  the  global  portion)  and  land  owners.  There
in  i,  resulting  from  a  change  in  t,  would  imply  is  a partial  shifting  of the total tax  on local  land
that  the incidence  of the  property  tax  is  not un-  owners under these conditions.
like that of a profits tax  [6].  If Mp  were to adjust
under similar conditions, this would indicate back-  ESTIMATION  PROCEDURES
ward  shifting of  the property  tax to other  factors
of production.  The above discussion suggests three alternative
Changes  in  property  taxes  may  be  shifted  hypothesis regarding the shifting of property  taxes.
forward  to  consumers  through  changes  in  food  Which  of, these  is  the  most  appropriate  shifting
and fiber prices.  For  this  to  occur,  increased  tax  hypothesis  can  be tested,  using  a procedure  sug-
levels must be incorporated into the cost structure  gested  by  Hall  in  his  analysis  of  the  shifting  of
of the production unit rather than being capitalized  corporate  income taxes  [3].  Basically,  Hall's pro-
into  lower  property  values.  That  is,  if  property  cedure is  to compute  the rental  value  of land  for
taxes  were  to  increase,  property  owners  would  each element  of a  sample  under  alternative  shift-
be forced to increase rental rates by the amount of  ing  assumptions  (detailed  below).  Then  each  of
tax or face a decline in property values.4 Increased  the  alternative  rental  values  are  employed  in the
rental rates  would  increase  average fixed  costs  of  estimation  of  a  Cobb-Douglas  production  func-
the  renter,  ceteris  paribus,  and  the  break-even  tion,  all  other  factors  being  the  same  for  each
price  for the  production  unit  would  go  up.  Mar-  estimation.  That  is,  a  Cobb-Douglas  production
ginal units would  be driven out  of production  and  function  is estimated  using ordinary  least squares
product prices  would  increase.  for each computation  of rental value  of land.  The
The  key  question  in  this  chain  of  events  is  rental  value with  the best fit is  presumed  to  rep-
whether the owner can, in fact, change rental rates  resent the  most appropriate  shifting  assumption.
to reflect tax changes.  Recently,  Mieszkowski  sug-  Three  shifting hypotheses  will  be  tested  using
gested  that  a  distinction must  be  drawn  between  aggregate  production  data  for  U.S.  agriculture.
local and global impacts  of property  taxes  [6,  7].  The three hypotheses concerning  rental values (R)
Suppose  that  every  taxing  district  in  the  United  are  that property taxes  are  fully  shifted  (Rf),  not
3 For no shifting  of property  taxes to  occur, the  supply  of land must  be  perfectly  inelastic  [91.  That  the  inverse  is  not necessarily
true  is the topic  of this  paper.
4 This  adjustment process  is particularly  feasible in  the majority  of cases  where  owner and renter  are  embodied in  a single  manager.
5 Note  that the  empirical  results  of cross-sectional  land  value  studies  such  as  [1,  91  are  consistent  with  this  argument.
132shifted  (Rn),  and  partially shifted  (Rp)  forward  penses  plus  depreciation.  All  data
to consumers.  If the  full burden  of property  taxes  used  in  the  estimation  of  K  are  from
is shifted forward to the consumer, then rental value  [3,  Table  8].  K  is  computed  as  the
of  land  in  the  production  function  (Rf)  must  be  sum  of  total  current  farm  operating
Rf = Vi. On  the other hand,  if all  taxes are capita-  expenses  plus  depreciation  and  other
lized  into  land values,  then  gross  return  to  land  is  consumption  of  farm  capital  minus
i +  t  and  Rn = V(i +  t).  If there  is  partial  shift-  miscellaneous  expenses  and  hired  la-
ing  such  that  only  that  portion  of  local  property  bor expenses.
taxes  that  are  above  the  global  tax  rate  (t - tg)
are  capitalized,  then  the  appropriate  rental  value  RESULTS
for  each  element  of  the  sample  is  Rp = V(i +  t
- tg).  The three  shifting hypotheses  will  be tested  The estimated parameters  for (7)  are presented
using  Hall's  procedure  described  above  and  a  Table  . coefficients  were  of  the  proper
Cobb-Douglas  production  function  of  the  form  sign  and  significantly  different from  zero  at  99% confidence  levels.  In  his study,  Hall compared  the lg Q = lg a +  bi lg R +  b2 lg L +  b3 lg K  (7)  R2 obtained  under  different  shifting  assumptions
where  Q,  L  and  K  are  output,  labor  and  capital,  as  a  criterion  for  selecting  the  most  appropriate
respectively.  Equation  (7)  will  be  estimated  using  shifting  assumption.  The  higher  the  R2 obtained,
R =  Rf,  then  again  with  R = Rn  and  finally  for  he  argued,  the  more  appropriate  the  procedures
R =  Rp.  Ordinary  least  squares  estimates  will  be  used to compute the variables.  Musgrave criticized
obtained  for  1959,  1964  and  1969  to  provide  Hall's  conclusions,  arguing  that differences  in  the
some generality to the results.  R2's  were  so  small  that  it  became  impossible  to
Cross-sectional  data  treating  each  of  the  48  determine  the significance  of  the  comparative  ex-
contigious states  as  an observation  will be  used to  planatory  power  of  different  estimates  [6].  The
estimate  (7).  These  data  are  appropriate  to  test  same  problem  exists  with  the  R2's  presented  in
global,  rather  than local  impacts  of property  tax-  Table  1.6
ation.  Individual  variables  used  are  specified  in  An alternative  criterion for  selecting  the  most
the following manner:  appropriate  shifting  assumption  is  the partial  sum
V: The value  of farm land excluding  f squares  accounted for by land. The partial  sum
Vbuildings  4, Tables  2-49]excl.  of squares  of land is nothing more than the  sum of buildings  [4,  Tables 2-49].
i:  The  opportunity  cost  of  capital,  as-  squares  that  is  accounted  for  by  land,  after  both
sumed constant  at five percent.  labor  and  capital  have  already  been  brought  into
t: Farm  real  estate  taxes per  $100  mar-  the  model.  The right column  of  Table  1 presents t:  Farm  real  estate  taxes  per  $100  mar-
ket  value  [4,  Tables  2-49].  In  1969  the  partial  sums  of  squares  for  the  land  variable
-et  value  [4,  Tables  2-491.  In  1969  under  each  of  the  three  shifting  assumptions. the value of t ranged from a minimum  assumptions.
value  of  $0.25  to  a  maximum  of
$2.43.  DISCUSSION
tg:  The global  tax rate  (described  above)  Results  for  1959  and  1964  seem  to favor the
equal to either  the  minimum or mean  assumption  that  the  full  value  of  the  property
value of t.  tax  is  shifted  forward  to  the  consumer.  Estimates
Q:  Realized  gross farm  income  [2,  Table  in  Table  1 fail  to  contradict  the  hypothesis  that
6].  property  taxes  are  not  fully  capitalized.  Results
L:  The  value of  all farm  labor  computed  for  1969  seem  to  favor  the  partial  and  no  shift
by  dividing  hired  labor  expense  [2,  models.  Further scrutiny of the results is needed to
Table  8]  by the  annual  average  num-  determine  why  1969 cross-sectional  differences  in
ber  of  hired  workers  on  farms  [10].  the  property  tax  were  apparently  capitalized  into
This  implicit  wage  is  then  multiplied  land  values,  while  such  differences  in  1959  and
by the annual average  number of total  1964  were  apparently  shifted  forward  to  the
farm  workers  (hired  and family)  [10]  consumer  rather than being  capitalized.  One pos-
to give total labor value.  sible  explanation  of  these results  may  rest  in  the
K:  Capital  is  equal  to  production  ex-  dynamics  of the land market.
6 The author  is unaware  of an  appropriate  statistical  test  for  significant  differences  between  the  estimates.  As  a  consequence,  any inferences  based  on  the  statistical  results  presented  must  be  treated  with  caution.
133Table  1.  ESTIMATED  COEFFICIENTS  OF  COBB-DOUGLAS  PRODUCTION  FUNCTIONS  FOR
U.S.  AGRICULTURE  ALTERNATIVE  HYPOTHESES  REGARDING  THE  SHIFTING
OF  PROPERTY  TAXES
a/
Production  Elasticities-  2  Partial  Sum-of-
Model  and  Year  R  Squares  Added
Land  Labor  Capital  by Land
No Shift
1959  0.273  0.173  0.553  0.9893  0.468
1964  .167  .181  .698  .9888  .193
1969  .192  .168  .661  .9910  .169
Full  Shift
1959  .261  .188  .551  .9905  .523
1964  .160  .195  .691  .9894  .230
1969  .160  .192  .671  .9907  .149
Partial  Shift  (Tg  =
lowest  U.S.  tax
rate)
1959  .273  .172  .554  .9893  .463
1964  .167  .180  .670  .9887  .190
1969  .193  .167  .661  .9911  .170
Partial  Shift  (Tg  =
average  U.S.  rate)
1959  .273  .171  .555  .9890  .450
1964  .166  .180  .701  .9885  .182
1969  .196  .163  .661  .9911  .171
a All  estimated  coefficients  are  significantly  different  from  zero  at  the  1%o  level  of  significance.
Current land values  may  be influenced  by the  value of agricultural  land if they accrue  to owners.
expectations  of future  earnings  streams.  As  these  Consequently,  forward  shifting  is  expected  to  be
expectations  vary  around  some  established  norm,  more intense  after prices  and tax rates  have  been
ceteris  paribus,  land  prices  vary.  In  periods  of  relatively  stable,  and capitalization or less  shifting
stable  prices  and  tax  rates,  the  rental  value  and  may  suggest  prior  years  of  unstable  prices  and
cost structure  of the typical firm adjust to include  taxes.
global  property taxes,  thus  shifting  the burden  of  Data  in Table  2  show  that  for  several  years
the  tax  forward  to  the  consumer.  But  in  times  preceding  1959 and  1964,  product prices  and  the
of price variability  and/or changes in the effective  level  of property  tax  rates  were  relatively  stable,
tax rate, there  may  be  some temporary  capitaliza-  while  land  prices  increased  by  61/4  percent  and
tion  effects,  as  owners  and  renters  continually  41/2  percent respectively.
adjust  to  a new  equilibrium.  Lags  in  the  adjust-  However,  in  the  period  preceding  the  1969
ment  process  will produce  pure  economic  profits  observation,  product  prices  increased  substanti-
and  losses that may be capitalized  into the market  ally.  An  annual  increase  of  this  magnitude  over
134a five-year period would  certainly tend to increase  increased  at  an  annual  rate  of  2.5  percent.  This
earnings expectations  and hence the value of land.  increase  in  the  property  tax  must  have  been
But  land  values only  increased  at  a  rate  of  6.38  capitalized  into property values,  thereby offsetting
percent,  which  is  not  unlike  the  average  rate  of  increases  in expected  earnings  associated  with  in-
increase  during  the  previous  decade.  The  reason  creasing  prices.  This  may  explain  why  1969
that land prices did not shoot up during the  1965-  estimates  of  (7)  using  Rn  and  Rp  were  preferred
1969 period  may be that the effective  tax rate also  over estimates  using Rf.
Table  2.  AVERAGE  GROWTH  RATES  OF LAND  VALUES,  PRICES,  AND  TAX  RATES  ON
AGRICULTURAL  LAND  IN THE  U.S.,  1955-1969
Average  Annual  Rate  of  Growth
Perioda/  Effective
Land  Values-  Food  Prices  Property  Tax -
Rate
1955-59  6.25%  -0.16%  0.23%
1960-64  4.46  0.36  1.08
1965-69  6.38  3.78  2.52
a Source:  [4].
b Source:  [  11].
If  this  explanation  is  valid,  then  when  tax  land in the United  States  is  shifted forward  to the
rates  and prices  stabilize,  the  build-up  capitaliza-  consumer  in  the  form  of  higher  food  prices.  For
tion  of  taxes  in  land  values  probably  will  be  this  to  occur, land  owners  must  increase  the  rent
transferred  into the renters'  cost structure,  as land-  they  charge  land  renters  to  reflect  property  tax
owners  adjust  their  rental  agreements  to  reflect  payments.  Since  most  "renters"  are  their  own
increased tax burdens.  Through this process, land.  owners,  the  possibility  of  forward  shifting  is  not
owners  do bear the  initial  burden  of property  tax  as remote  as  it may  first appear.  A unique  test of
adjustments.  The likelihood  remains,  though,  that  this  hypothesis  using  a  procedure  suggested  by
the burden  will  eventually  be  shifted  forward  to  Hall  showed  that  in  two  of  three  years  studied
the  consumer  in the form  of  higher  food prices,  forward  shifting may  have  occurred.
The  discussion  was then  extended  to consider
SUMMARY  the dynamics  of the land market  and other factors
A simple  tax model  was  developed  to  analyze  that  may  have  influenced  the  results.  While  the
the  incidence  or  shifting  of  the  property  tax  in  results  of this  study are interesting,  additional test-
American agriculture.  While  it is generally  agreed  ig  f  the  hypothesis  is  needed  before  any  solid
that property taxes are capitalized into land values,  conclusions  may  be  reached.  Further  analyses
the  model  points  out that  forward  and backward  might follow  a similar  procedure  using  data col-
shifting  are  also possible.  lected  at  a  more  micro  level  than  was  the  case
The central  hypothesis  of this paper  is  that  at  in the present study.
least a  portion  of the property  tax on  agricultural
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